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PRAESCRIPTJO TEMPORIS AND ITS RELATION TO
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS IN THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
MPA P. OPAL*
Lapse of time, coupled with non-possession or inaction,
may alter a man's legal position vis-a-vis his property, both
corporeal and incorporeal, in several different ways. The law
may (1) bar the owner from asserting his rights by a droitural
action and thus leave these rights suspended in a state of
unenforceability; (2) extinguish his legal right as well as his
remedy; (3) transfer his rights to another who has exercised
them by long-continued possession or use; and (4) impose a
presumption that long-continued possession or use by another
had its beginning in a lawful devolution of right. The legal
concept embodied in the first example aims at destroying
actionability only, while that in the second example also ef-
fects an extinguishment of rights. Both have an essentially
negative or divestitive character. In the last two examples
the effect is positive or investitive.
A closer look at these four concepts reveals distinct ap-
proaches to the effect which lapse of time is to produce. The
approach described in the first example differs drastically
from all others because it alone operates solely to bar actions.
The dichotomy of right and remedy it creates is a phenomenon
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peculiar to the mediaeval common law in which it is known
in legal parlance by the term "limitation of actions".' In the
second and third example lapse of time affects primarily
rights. In the former it operates to produce their extinguish-
ment, in the latter it affords a mode of acquiring them. Both
of these last mentioned examples represent an institution
known in the language of modern civil law by the term "pre-
scription". Prescription that destroys rights is called "extinc-
tive", and prescription that creates new rights is termed "ac-
quisitive".2 The approach described in the fourth example,
that of imposing a presumption, differs somewhat from an
acquisitive prescription, though its effect is also investitive.
A presumption does not afford a mode of acquiring new rights
but rather provides a means of protecting a presumably law-
ful acquisition of presently existing rights, whose origin is
lost in antiquity. It is a legal substitute for title supplied
through an evidentiary device Its employment is found both
in the common and Roman law systems.
1 "An immortal right to bring an eternally prohibited action
is a metaphysical subtlety" produced by feudal jurists. The
notion that a right may survive the extinction of all reme-
dies for its enforcement is peculiar to the Anglo-American
law. Ams, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MIscELLANEous
LEGAL EsAYs 199 (1913).
2 MAdKELDEY, HANDBOOK OF RomA= LAW 226 (Dropsie transl.
1883); SHE~mA, 2 ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 216
(1922); the useful distinction between acquisition of rights
by lapse of time and extinction of rights by lapse of time
was first introduced by mediaeval writers. The terms "ex-
tinctive" and "acquisitive" do not appear in Roman texts
and Savigny objected to their use. 4 SAviGNY, SYSTEM DES
HEUTIGEN RommscmN REcHIs 313 (1841); DE COLQUOHOuN,
2 SUnARY OF THE ROMAN Civn LAw 149 (1851); ScHUsTR,
Tm PmNCIPLES OF GERMAN CIVIL LAW 129 (1907). Modern
civil codes have adopted these terms and follow the dis-
tinction. 2 SHERMAN, Rom= LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD
217 (1922).
8 "Non tam est praescriptio quam titulus". 1 PLANIOL, CIVL
LAw TREATISE, Pt. 2, § 2946, p. 736 (Louisiana State Law
[Vol. 7, No. 2
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Acquisitive prescription as a mode of creating title to
land was unknown to the mediaeval common law4 Neither
was extinctive prescription recognized. The feudal law of
England simply did not allow tenurial rights ever to be de-
stroyed. The limitation of actions could bar only the dis-
seisee's remedy but never his right.6 This basic approach is
reflected in the ancient maxims which, in a somewhat more
restrictive sense, still have currency in American law: "Mere
lapse of time may serve as a shield for the tenant, but it can-
not serve as a sword for the demandant",7 "A right cannot
Institute transl. 1959). In a presumption the right is treated
as "altbegruendet" (anciently founded), in prescription as
now created. DEEmURG, ROEmsCHEs REcHT, MUELLER VEPLAG,
381 (1911); also, SAVIGNY, supra note 2 at 528.
4 2 POLLOCK AND AtLAm, HISTORY OF ENGLISH COmmON LAW
81 (1911); also, 3 HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH COM-
MoN LAW 166 (1926).
5 PoLLocK An MArTN , supra note 4 at 141. The annihilation
of an estate of a feudal tenant was inconceivable; if this
were allowed either of three results would come about:
(1) forfeiture to the Crown; (2) Escheat to the lord; and
(3) ownership would become allodial. Meredith, A Paradox
of Sugden's, 34 L.Q.R. 253, 259.
6 "The man who cannot allege a seisin on this side of Henry
II's day [coronation of Henry II in 1154, fixed by Statute
of Merton, 1235, 20 Hen. 3, c.8, as a limitation on the writ
of right] has lost every action for the land; but it does not
follow that his right is extinct. Hereafter it may prove its
vitality, if this man, having obtained seisin under some
new or defeasible title, is 'remitted' to the oldest title that
he has." POLLOCK ANm MAITLAND, supra note 4 at 141. This
is so because an English feudal tenant always retains his
ius naius, also called by its Norman French name of mere
dreit (droit majeur). HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4 at 89; also,
GUETmRoCK, BRACTON AND HIs RELATION TO THE ROMAN LAW
120 (Cox transl. 1866); and also, PoLLoCK AND MAITLAND,
supra note 4 at 77, note 1.
7 Id. at 141; As late as 1899 the Kansas Supreme Court held
that a statute of limitation which bars recovery of land is
a "weapon of resistance, not of attack". Corlett v. Insurance
Co., 60 Kan. 134, 55 P. 844 (1899). This rule was later changed
19711
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die",8 "The statute of limitation operates merely upon the
remedy and does not bar the right".9
Easements and profits comprise the only branch of the
common law which escaped the imposition of the right-remedy
dichotomy regime of limitations.10 In the common law system
easements include those accessorial rights to one's soil which
confer merely a convenience to be exercised over the neigh-
boring land, without any participation in the profits of it;"
in Freeman v. Funk, 85 Kan. 473, 117 P. 1024 (1911). The lat-
ter holding was followed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Stolfa v. Gaines, 140 Okla. 292, 283 P. 563, 567-70 (1930). In
Stolfa the court recognized the provisions of OKLA. STAT. tit.
60, §333 as abrogating the common law and effectively invest-
ing with title the adverse ocupant for the period that is pre-
scribed as sufficient to bar recovery of the property. "When
that bar became effective, it resulted in the acquisition of title
to the property by the plaintiff by prescription" (283 P. at
570). A few American courts made an early departure from
the right-remedy dichotomy of the common law. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court held in Eingartner v. Illinois Steel
Co., 103 Wisc. 373, 376, that "The law deals only with en-
forceable rights, and if such a right be changed into a mere
moral obligation, in a legal sense it no longer exists at all."
8 CoKE ON LITTLETON, INSTITUTEs oF THE LAW OF ENGLAND §§
279 and 478 (1853). The maxim was expressed in Latin
as dormit aliquando ius, moritur numquam. POLLOCK AND
MAmAND, supra note 4 at 141.
' WooD, LIvIATioNS OF AcTIoNs 18 (1882). The right-remedy
dichotomy may have far-reaching practical consequences.
NIcHOLAS, R OMAN LAW 120 (1962); SALmOND, JURISPRUDENCE
614-15 (9th ed. 1936); POLLOCK AND MAiTLAND, supra note 4
at 123, 414-5. Salmond calls the English limitations an "im-
perfect negative prescription." SALMoD., JURISPRUDENcE 618
(9th ed. 1936).
10 HoLDswoRTH, supra note 4 at 166; POLLOCK AND MITLAmqP,
supra note 4 at 141-2.
n The word "easement" comes from Norman French "aise"
and "aisance", meaning neighborhood, neighborliness, com-
fort, opportunity and convenience. It is derived from Latin
adiacens (adjacent). In Latin manuscripts the word ap-
[Vol. 7, No. 2
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those accessorial rights which are accompanied with a parti-
cipation in the profits of the neighboring soil are called profits
a prendre (such as rights of pasture or of digging sand). Both
classes of these accessorial rights are comprehended under
the servitudes of the civil law.12 The English law since the
time of Bracton (1200-1268), if not since a century earlier, has
allowed easements to be acquired through immemorial user
termed "prescription". This was the only form of acquisitive
prescription known to the common law. Its application has
been firmly restricted to easements and profits.13
Though much has been written about the history of pre-
scriptive easements in the Anglo-American law, little insight
can be gained from the existing literature into the non-Eng-
lish antecedents of immemorial prescription and their course
of evolution. This study will endeavor to trace immemorial
prescription through the canon law into the Roman texts
whence it came; to show that prescriptive easements in the
English law evolved along a pattern very similar to that of
pears as aisiamenta. In its original Norman French mean-
ing the term may have been broad enough to comprise all
servitudes. GUETERBOCK, supra note 6 at 174.
12 GAYLE, EASEMENTS 1-2 (5th ed. 1876).
13 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4 at 166. Early common law may
have recognized that social status was subject to change
by prescription. Under some royal charters, not uncommon
in the Middle Ages, it was possible for anyone who had
lived in the town for a year and a day to acquire the status
of a burgher. Thus, an escaped villein, fortunate to evade
detection during the requisite period while living in such
chartered town, would acquire burgher status by lapse of
time. KNAPPEN, CoNsTTUTONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENG-
LAND 162 (1942). A family of freemen could probably be
reduced to villeinage status by proof that they have per-
formed unfree services for four to five generations. Chief
Justice Hengham's statement that "praescriptio temporis
non redigit sanguinem liberun in servitutem", appears to
be of doubtful historicity. 8 GRAVESON, STATUS ix =H COm-
MON LAW (1953).
1971]
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the longa possessio developed by the praetors as a foundation
for the acquisition of servitudes; and that both of these in-
stitutions ultimately gave way to a fixed period of prescrip-
tion, though each underwent a different process of transition
in the Roman, English and American law.
Prescription is a term of Roman 1 a w with a telling
etymology. It is a derivative of Latin "praescriptio", mean-
ing something written first, above or before. The word made
its debut in the Roman law of the late republic and the early
empire as a term of art used in the formulary procedure be-
fore the praetors. In its early form it consisted of a state-
ment "written above" plaintiff's claim in the regular part
(declaratio) of the formula directed by the praetor to the
trier of facts variously designated as iudex, arbiter, or re-
cuperator.14 The object of the praescriptio was to direct the
trier of facts to dispose of a preliminary objection before pro-
ceeding to the main issue. Among the more important objec-
tions available to the defendant was praescriptio temporis-
a plea based on the effect of lapse of time.15 When a proprietor
claimed a thing or right from one who had been in possession
of it for a long time, the formula sent to the trier of facts
recited: Ea res agatur, cuius non est longi temporis possessio
(proceed to determine the main issue if you find that the
defendant has not been in long-continued possession).16 After
the formulary procedure fell into disuse in the days of the
late empire praescriptio, by process of metonymy and ab-
breviation, acquired its present day meaning.1 In modern civil
14 "Praescriptiones sic appellatas esse ab eo quod ante formulas
praescribuntur plus quam manifestum est". Gaius IV. 132.
15 Gaius IV. 133; Sherman, Acquisitive Prescription-Its Ex-
isting World-Wide Uniformity, 21 YALE L.J. 147-8 (1912);
see also, 1 UNTERHOLZNER, VERJAEHRUNGSLEHRE 9 (1928).
16 SANDARS, THE INsTITUTEs OF JusTn" 208 (1876).
17 SALmoND, supra note 9 at 613; BummicK, PpNCIPLrS OF RomAN
LAW Am Thm RELATION TO MODERN LAW 528 (1938); SHER-
iAN supra note 15 at 215.
[Vol. 7, No. 2
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and canon law prescription is universally used as a term de-
noting the manner "of acquiring and losing the right of prop-
erty in a thing, and all other rights, by the effect of time."13
Prescription was a stranger to the ancient Anglo-Saxon
law.19 The precise time of its entry into post-Conquest
England cannot be fixed with any degree of accuracy. The
best estimate is that the judges began to apply it in the
twelfth or thirteenth century.20 Glanville, whose Tractatus de
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae is believed to have
been written between 1180 and 1189, makes no mention of
prescription.2 1 What is certain is that various limitations of
time for recovery of land had already gained a firm foothold
when the rudimentary notion of lapse of time as a mode of
acquiring rights by operation of law made its first recorded
appearance in Bracton's De Legibus Angliae.22 It is not certain
when Bracton wrote his treatise. The time is variously esti-
mated at between 1256 and 1259, between 1250 and 125823
(when he served as a judge of King Henry III), or simply at
"before 1239" (when he was the clerk of Judge William Ral-
eigh).24 This entire period (and, indeed, the entire century
between 1150 and 1250) is marked by the strongest direct in-
fluence of the civil and cannon law upon the development
Is 1 DOMAT, CiVIL LAW 872 (1824). CASTEL, THE Ci LAW
SYSTEM IN THE PRovINcE OF QUEBEC 145 (1962); CICOGNANI,
CANON LAW 651 (1932).
19 SHEim", supra note 15 at 149.
20 SALMOND, supra note 9 at 268.
21 GUETERBocK, supra note 6 at 118.
22 Pre-Bractonian limitations of time on the writ of right are:
Henry I's accession on August 5, 1100 (GLAvmLE, LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF THE KiNGDOM OF ENGLAND 237, 240 (1890);
the death of Henry I in 1135 (3 Selden Society, Selected
Civil Pleas, Baildon ed. 1889); and by Statute of Merton,
1235, 20 Hen. 3, c.8, the limitation was fixed at the accession
of Henry H in 1154.
0 ATvms, supra note 1 at 31.
24 KANToRoWIcz, BBACTONiAN PROBLEMS 24, 26, 36 (1941).
19'71]
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of English institutions then in a formative stage.25 Bracton's
use of Roman law texts and terms, as well as his plagiarism
from Azo,2 6 have been the subject of much discussion in the
last one hundred years or even longer.27 While the writers
vary widely in their views about the accuracy, extent, quality
and impact of Bracton's "borrowings" from the civilians, all
seem to agree upon the presence of some "Romanesque" con-
tent linking Bracton, through Azo, to the Corpus Juris Civilis
and to the canonists.2 8
Aside from explaining the rudimentary concept" of lapse
of time as capable of creating rights, Bracton made two other
lasting contributions to the developments of prescriptive ease-
ments. Firstly, Bracton's idea that the prescriptive user must
215 Woodbine, Origins of the Action of Trespass, 33 YALE L.J.
799, 813 (1924).
26 Azo, referred to as one of the most distinguished of all
glossators, died in 1230. He was a student of Rogerius, who
in turn was a disciple of Bulgarus, one of the quattuor
doctores who followed Irnerius. Besides glosses, Azo also
wrote distinctiones and brocarda. By far the most influen-
tial of his writings are his two summae. Sass, Medieval
Roman Law: A Guide to the Sources and Literature, 58
LAw Lia. J. 130, 143. GuETarEocK, supra note 6 at 51.
27 HIouard, a Frenchman, who published in 1776 his Traites
sur Les Coutumes Anglo-Normandes, was so struck with
Bracton's Romanizing tendencies that he excluded him en-
tirely from his collection of Anglo-Norman legal sources,
though he listed Glanville and Fleta. Scrutton, Roman Law
in Bracton, 1 L.Q.R. 425. Some writers look upon Bracton's
De Legibus as a corruption of the English Law, others claim
that he has in general reproduced only those Roman ele-
ments which were actually received in England as valid
law, though in some instances he has made additions to
them. KAMTOROWCZ, supra note 24 at 80; MAni, ANCIENT
LAW 82 (1864).
28 2 HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 267-82 (1926);
Woodbine, Roman Element in Bracton, 31 YALE L.J. 827,
828, 840; and A Bracton Symposium, 42 TuLAmi L.R. 455-602
(1968).
29 Gueterbock doubts whether Bracton really understood the
[Vol. 7, No. 2
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be nec vi nec clam nee precario,0 which he had doubtless
copied from the Digest, either directly or through Azo,81 be-
came firmly settled in the common law;32 secondly, Bracton's
requirement that the longum tempus 33 (he also mentions
diuturnus usus) necessary to bound precriptive title to
an easement be one which "excedit memoriam hominum",3 4
was adopted by the common law as its immemorial prescrip-
tion-the only acquisitive prescription then known to that
system. 5 The immemorial period of prescription Bracton ap-
pears to have borrowed from a passage in Azo: Nam constitu-
untur servitutes per consuetudinem temporis, cujus non ex-
stat memoria.30 Soon after Bracton's time, his simple descrip-
tion of a long user extending beyond human memory became
known to the English jurists by the turgid, and far less intel-
ligible, Norman French phrase "de temps dont memorie des
homes ne curt a le contrarie",3 7 from which it was translated
into English as "time whereof the memory of man runneth or
knoweth not to the contrary",38 or, more simply, as "time out
meaning of acquisitive prescription. He quotes a passage
in which Bracton speaks of prescription, not as a means
of acquiring the right of property, but only rights of pos-
session (modus acquirendi possessionis; adquiritur pos-
sessio ex tempore) GUETmBoCK, supra note 6 at 119.
30 BRAcToN, DE LEGiBUs ANGLIE 221, 222b (Woodbine ed. 1932).
31 D. 8, 5, 10 pr.; C. 3, 34, 2; C. 3, 34, 1; D. 39, 3, 1. (All citations
to the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian when referring to
the Digest are prefixed by the letter D.; those referring to
the Novellae by N.; those referring to the Institutes by I.;
and those referring to the Code by C.).
32 7 HoLDswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 343 (1926).
33 BRACTON, supra note 30 at 51b, 52.
34 Id. at 221, 222b, 230; also, COKE ON LITTLETON, supra note
8.at l15a.
35 2 BLACKSTONE, CoMwENTARiEs 264 (Hammond ed. 1889).
30 GroTEP.OCK, supra note 6 at 124.
37 CoKE ON LIrETON, supra note 8 at § 170.
38 Id. at § 1115a; SniPsoN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY
OF LA= LAW 103 (1961).
19711
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of minde".3 9 The variance between Bracton's and Azo's Latin
on the one hand, and the law French description of immemor-
ial time on the other, appears too significant to go unnoticed
or be dismissed as purely accidental. The language of Bracton
and Azo bear a remarkably close resemblance to the phrases
found in the Roman texts: "cuius origo memoriam excessit",40
"quorum memoriam vetustas excedit"41 and "si memoria eius
non extat"-42 the law French formulation of immemorial time,
and its literal English translation, bear the unmistakable im-
print of mediaeval Latin usage of the canonists who often re-
ferred to immemorial antiquity in terms of "tempus, cujus con-
trarii hodie non existit memoria.48 This alone affords a rather
strong basis for suspicion that the common law definition of
immemorial time may have been taken directly from canonist
manuscripts either before or after Bracton. Maine44 suggests
that two influential groups in post-Conquest England com-
bined forces to impose the adoption of immemorial prescription
and to reject Roman law's definite prescriptive periods; 45 one
89 CoKE ox LrrLETON, supra note 8 at § 114b.
40 D. 43, 20, 3, 4.
41 D. 39, 3, 2, 3.
42 D. 39, 3, 2, 5. There are only three places in the Roman
law sources in which immemorial time is mentioned. These
are: D. 43, 20, 3, 4; D. 39, 3, 2 and D. 22, 3, 28. UNTERHOLZUNM,
supra note 15 at 502; SAviGNY, supra note 2 at 485. Savigny
takes the position that faulty exposition has brought im-
memorial prescription into the Roman Law. "Die Immemo-
rialpraescription ist ueberhaupt blas durch exegetische
Missverstaendnisse in das Roemische Recht hineingetragen
worden." SAVIGNY, DAs RECHT DES BESITZES 53 (1837).
43 UNTEHOLMZ_, supra note 15 at 515-18; SAVIGNY, supra note
2 at 506, 508, 509.
44 MAINE, supra note 27 at 276-7.
45 The Roman law, in its final stage of development, pro-
duced several definite periods of prescription. These were
carried into the Corpus Juris Civilis as Iongi temporis prae-
scriptio, I. 2, 5 pr.; C. 7, 31, 1, which provided a period of
three years for moveables and, in case of immovables, ten
years, if the parties resided in the same province, and 20
(Vol. 7, No. 2
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was composed of canonists and the other of scholastically-
minded feudal jurists. The former regarded the privileges of
the church as incapable of being lost through disuse, the latter
"taught .that whatever turn actual legislation might take, a
right howsoever long neglected, was in point of fact indestruc-
tible." The canonists recognized time immemorial not merely
as a period of prescription, but also as a condition of the
validity of customary law over ius commune ecclesiae (the
general law of the church). According to the canon law, cus-
tom could not derogate from the church law unless established
from immemorial time. This was expressed by the Latin max-
ims "consuetudo praescripta praejudicat juri commun', 46
"consuetudo a tempore, cujus non extat memoria, introducta",4
and "illa consuetudo praejudicat juri, quae excedit hominum
memoriam".48 At a later time this period was reduced to forty
years of continuous and uninterrupted usage, but as "against
an ecclesiastical law which contains a clause forbidding con-
trary customs in the future, only a reasonable custom that is
either immemorial or centenary can obtain the force of law."49
The change, when made, came too late to alter the common
law in which the earlier canonical principle requiring imme-
morial antiquity for recognition of customs and rights had
already made a secure place for itself through the influence
of ecclesiastical judiciary.50 It had also passed into the law
of France, Germany and Spain, where it was received in a
years if they resided in different provinces; if they lived
in the same province a part of the time, and in different
provinces a part, two years of absence counted as one year
of presence. N. 119, 8; and as longissimi temporis prae-
scriptio, C. 7, 39, 8, of 30 and 40 years applicable to cases
in which the prescribing claimant had no iustus titulus.
40 SALMOND, supra note 9 at 268.
47 SHEmAN, supra note 15 at 225.
48 SALMOND, supra note 9 at 269, note (g).
4) CicOGNANI, supra note 18 at 649-52.
G0 SALMOND, supra note 9 at 270.
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much more limited degree. 1
The origin of immemorial time as a prescriptive period is
often attributable to Roman texts. It is said that in Roman
law servitudes could be acquired by immemorial user.52 That
thesis is highly questionable. As Savigny points out, no private
rights in servitudes could be established in Roman law by
user extending beyond the span of human memory. The three
passages in the Digest which make mention of immemorial time
apply exclusively to acquisition of public rights in common
ways, protective installations against rainwater and in water-
ways. 3 The mediaeval praescriptio immemorialis is rather to
be regarded as an ecclesiastical invention brought about
through an extended exposition of Roman sources to meet
canonical predilections.54 Its manifest purpose was to protect
the church against loss of property and encroachment of cus-
toms upon the commune jus ecclesiae. And since this goal
happened partly to coincide with the interests of feudal barons,
51 Immemorial prescription in France required possession for
100 years. Its application to servitudes was abolished in
France as well as in Louisiana. C. Civ. art. 691 (Napole-
onic Code); LA. Civ. CODE art. 766. These articles define
immemorial possession as "that of which no man living
has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has
learned from his elders." Planiol, supra note 3 at 735. Un-
der the Las Siete Partidas compilation of Spain, promul-
gated in 1348, but prepared between 1256-1263 (the time
of Bracton), discontinuous easements could be acquired by
immemorial prescription. Las Siete Partidas, Partida 3,
Title XXXI, 1. 15; immemorial user is still recognized as
an "extra-ordinary" basis for acquisitive prescription of
servitudes by the uncodified Roman-Dutch law of South
Africa. LEE, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN-DUTCH LAw 173 (1953).
In international law, as expounded by Grotius, "a posses-
sion going beyond memory absolutely transfers ownership."
GRoTIus, DE IuRE BELLI AC PACIS, 1. II, cap. IV, v (2).
52 SALMOND, supra note 9 at 269.
53 SAviGNY, supra note 2 at 481-505; see also note 42.
54 SAviGNY, supra note 42 at 53; SALMOND, supra note 9 at 269.
[Vol. 7, No. 2
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who deemed their tenurial rights to be perpetual, the church
had no difficulty in imposing its will upon post-Conquest
England. 5
The weight of textual authority strongly inclines to the
view that recognition of rights, when extended on the basis
of immemoriality, should be treated not as a prescription but
rather as an evidentiary presumption. By operation of pre-
scription title is added at a fixed point of time to long-contin-
ued possesson or use, and the effect is to create new rights,
though in some instances a previously completed acquisition,
whose proof cannot be made due to lost muniments of title,
may also fall within the ambit of protection. In contrast to
this, immemorial time is not a definite period at the end of
which rights change. Its primary aim is not to create new
rights by operation of law but to afford protection to rights
already existing, which were presumably lawfully acquired,
and to safeguard them from attack.56 Prescription is complete
when its fixed period has elapsed, and no proof may be ad-
mitted to show that the prescriber's right, if any he had, was
defective or fraught with infirmity before the passage of time.
Not so when immemoriality is relied upon for recognition of
rights. Even if the user exceed the memory of living men,
written proof to the contrary may be admitted to refute the
existence of the right, because Litera scripta manet, and when
by record or other writing human memory is "committed to
posterity", it is said to "tradere memoriae".7 This was the
5 Man=, supra note 27 at 276-7; Post-Conquest England re-
ceived "the most perfect form of feudal organization" and
its land law reflects that it became the most thoroughly
feudal of all the European states. Franklin, Bracton, Para-
Bracton (s), and the Vicarage of the Roman Law, 42 TuLA=
L.R. 455, 505 (1968).
GO SAviGNY, supra note 2 at 527-30; DENBURG, supra note 3 at
381; UNTMHOLZNER, supra note 15 at 532; 2 UNTERHOLZNER,
supra note 15 at 162; see also note 3.
57 COKE ON ITMLETON, supra note 8 at §115a.
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rule both at common law and on the Continent.68 In its actual
application the English immemorial user of easements func-
tioned merely to supply a rebuttable presumption of a lawful
origin of right.5 9
In Roman law prescriptive servitudes had a like beginning.
There is a marked similarity in the evolution of prescriptive
easements at common law and the prescriptive servitudes of
the Roman law. To begin with, neither system allowed rights
in solo alieno to be created by long-continued use. Post-Con-
quest England started out with a pre-existing absence of pre-
scription in the Anglo-Saxon law; in Rome, an old statute of
uncertain date, known as Lex Scribonia, abrogated or forbade
the acquisition of easements by lapse of time. 0 Neither system
required bona fides61 and iustus tituIuso2 of the prescribing
claimant. It was sufficient if the use sought to be prescribed
was enjoyed non vi non clam non precario (peacefully, openly
and without the servient owner's request or permission). Both
systems recognized tacking of possession (accessio temporis).03
In the formative stage of development there was no definite
prescriptive period either in the English or Roman law but
both systems ultimately passed to the stage of a fixed time
span. The law of Rome made this transition fairly smoothly,
58 Id.
19 SAviGNY, supra note 2 at 531-3; UNTERHOMZNER, supra note
15 at 532.10 D. 41, 2, 4, 28 (29); D. 8, 1, 14 pr.
61 There is some controversy concerning the bona fides, but
the weight of authority indicates that it was not required.
Ur-ERoLzNER, supra note 15 at 179; RADiN, ROmAN LAW
378 (1927); The common law does not require bona fides
for prescriptive acquisition. RADIN, RomAN LAW 366 (1927).
62 RADiN, supra note 61 at 378; UNTERHOLZNER, supra note 15
at 177-8; RADin, supra note 61 at 366; lustus titulus is "an
event or dealing which is normally the basis of acquisi-
tion", e.g. purchase, gift, legacy, finding an apparently
abandoned thing, etc. JOLowIcz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
TO RomAN LAW 153 (1952); RADin, supra note 61 at 365.
63 I. 2, 6, 13; D. 41, 4, 2, 20; C. 7, 31, 3; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
799, (New Abridged Edition 1940).
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the common law underwent a truly contortive evolution before
reaching that plateau. In the United States, as will be shown
later, the final stage is yet to be reached. Lastly, both in Eng-
land and in Rome prescriptive acquisition of rights in the
land of another passed from one stage to another in a process
of evolution separate from, though not entirely independent
of, the law governing prescriptive acquisition of title to land.
The Roman story is rather simple. In the old ius civile
there were apparently juristic objections to applying usucapio
to servitudes.0 The usucapion, an institution of the quiritary
law, afforded a means of acquiring dominium (ownership) of
immovable property by possession of two years' duration,
but this institution was available only to Roman citizens and
did not apply to land lying outside of Italy.0 Since in the
Twelve Tables no mention was made that incorporeal things
could also be acquired by usucapion, and servitudes were re-
garded as incapable of corporeal possession, it was thought
illogical and inconsistent to bring these rights in re aliena
within the benefit of usucapion. This is generally given as
the reason for enacting Lex Scribonia, of which mention was
made earlier.68 But despite the prohibition of this law, prae-
torian practice began to recognize the dominant use as having
the quality of quasi possessio or even possessio servitutis and
proceeded to extend protection to those claimants whose user
was characterized as longa possessio, diuturnus usus, vetust as,
longae possessionis praerogativa, longa consuetudo, consuetudo
longi temporis. This was done not only by allowing an excep-
rio founded upon it, but also by a utilis in rem actio.67 At
first, the length of time necessary to establish the right of long
user was left in the discretion of the trier of facts whose
decision had to be based on enjoyment non vi non clam non
6 DE COLQUOHOUN, supra note 2 at 143.
05 LEAGUE, ROMAN PrivATE LAW 134 (1906).
68 DE COLQUOHOUN, supra note 2 at 143.
07 PARTscH, DiE LONGI TEMPORIS PRAEScRIPTIo Im KLAssIscHEN
REcHT 96-100 (1906).
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precario. As early as 212 or 217 AD the rescript of Caracalla
established, by analogy to the previously introduced longi
temporis praescriptio (general prescription), that 10 years
inter praesentes (between residents of the same province)
and 20 years inter absentes (between parties residing in dif-
ferent districts) shall be applied as a time limit for the longa
possessio of servitudes68 Thus the official recognition of the
longa possessio of servitudes happened but a short time after
the rescript of Severus and Antoninus of December 29, 199
AD had enacted the longi temporis praescriptio as the ordinary
acquisitive prescription of Rome. Justinian finally abolished
Lex Scribonia and formally brought the servitudes (and all
incorporeal things) within the operation of laws governing
prescriptive acquisition of property.69
The recurrent reference found in the early Roman texts
to longa consuetudo suggests that the exceptio granted by the
praetor may have been predicated originally on a presumption
of a lawful beginning of the use which was drawn from an
openly practiced personal custom (consuetudo inter partes)
of a long duration, or on a presumption that a use openly prac-
ticed has matured into a personal custom which should be
accepted, at least prima facie.70 If this was so, then there is
here. a definite parallel to the early common law approach
in applying immemorial prescription. Easements could have
an origin either in grant (which was viewed as "special law");
in a "special" custom of the district which entitled certain
persons to rights in solo alieno; or in enjoyment of right from
time immemorial.71 Prescription was originally regarded as
a personal custom, namely, one limited to a particular claim-
ant. It differed from a local custom which was limited to a
particular place. Local and.personal customs were classed as
two species of particular customs, while the general customary
68 C. 3, 34, 2; PARTSCH, supra note 67 at 99.
69 PARTSCH, supra note 67 at 109; C. 7; 33, 12.
70 2 UNTmEOLZNE, supra note 15 at 158-64.
71 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4 at 166-9.
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(feudal) law of the realm constituted general custom.7 2 This
theory prevailed in the English law until easements by grant
became common before the end of the middle ages.73 After
that prescription. came to be thought of as founded, not so
much upon personal law or custom, as on a presumption that
immemorial user was conclusive evidence of a grant made
before the time -of legal memory.74 This development, as one
writer suggests, may have been occasioned by the mistaken
view that since prescription means literally "a prior writing"
it can have no application except through a presumption that
written indicia of title had been lost.7 5 When this presumption
took hold it led to decisions excluding from the benefit of
prescription all those persons who at common law were deem-
ed incapable of taking by grant.7 6
After prescription had passed from the stage of a pre-
sumption of lawful origin drawn from immemorial user to a
presumption of lawful creation drawn from a lost immemorial
grant, its further development became arrested in 1313. It was
then laid down in the case of The King v. Breaux77 that the
time of human memory required for founding immemorial
user reached as far back as September 3, 1189, the date of
Richard I's coronation. This date was selected by analogy to
the limitation period fixed in 1275, by the Statute of West-
72 SALMOND, supra note 9 at 267; CoKE ON LTTLETON, supra
note 8 at § 113b.
71 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4 at 98.
74 Id. at 170.
75 RPADin, supra note 61 at 364. This misconception appears
to be widely held. As late as 1964 an intermediate appellate
court in Louisiana used considerable space to explain that
acquisitive prescription in that state need not be based
on any "writing" at all. Lincoln Parrish School Board v.
Ruston College, 162 .So. 2d 419 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964);
writ denied, 246 La. 355, 164 So. 2d 354 (1964).
76 3 HoLDswoRTH, supra note 4 at 170; SnmsoN, supra note
38 at 103.
7" 29 Selden Society, 180.
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minster I., for bringing a writ of right to recover seisin.78 As
a result of this decision no claimant could prevail any longer
without showing that the user sought to be prescribed had
extended uninterruptedly nec vi nec clam itec prdcario back
to 1189. Conversely, the claimant was doomed to fail if his
opponent succeeded in proving that the user could not have
been enjoyed at some point of time after 1189. Since the date
of legal memory stood fixed, it was continually receding as
the time went on so that no one was able to prove any fact
reaching all the way back to such ancient date. Although in
154079 the limitation time for bringing the writ of right was
reduced to 60 years, and in 162380 the action of ejectment was
limited to twenty years, the courts refused to "readjust" the
time of legal memory to make it coincide with the new limita-
tions on recovery of land. This stituation led to the develop-
ment by equity courts of the so-called "lost grant" or "pre-
sumed grant" device. The initial trace of its employment in
the post-1313 period (which may be characterized as the
"legal memory straitjacket"), is found in a case decided in
1607,11 though the full development of the device did not come
about until the latter half of the eighteenth century when
the common law courts began to relax the rule requiring "pro-
fert" (production) of deeds on which title was sought to be
rested.8 2 In its actual application the lost-grant device is some-
what akin to the praetorian practice in pre-Caracalla days of
inferring the lawful beginning of a servitude from its long-
continued enjoyment in a peaceful, open and non-permissive
manner (Ionga possessio). The new English approach, as ulti-
mately evolved, simply armed the claimant with a presump-
tion that his long-continued user of rights in solo alieno ex-
78 7 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4 at 343; POLLOCK Am MITLAND,
supra note 4 at 168.
79 82 Hen. 8, c. 2, § 1 (1540); Stoebuck, The Fiction of Presumed
Grant, 15 KAN. L.R. 17, 26.
80 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, § 1. (1623).
81 Bedle V. Beard, 12 Co. Rep. 4, 77 Eng. Rep. 1288 (K.B. 1607).
82 7 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4 at 347.
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ercised non vi non clam non precario for a period of years
equal to that fixed by law for bringing an action of ejectment
to recover possession of land had its beginning in an ancient
grant which had been lost and was incapable of production
in court. Although at first there was considerable difference
of opinion as to the conclusiveness of this presumption, it is
now generally agreed that it was one juris et de jure and
hence irrebuttable.83 Until 1832 prescriptive acquisition of
easements in England was governed solely by the presumed
grant doctrine. The Prescription Act of that year 84 supplied
the English law, for the first time, with several fixed periods
for acquisition of easements by user. Its enactment was doubt-
less influenced by the Code Civil and by the absurdity of the
presumed grant fiction.85 The act was defectively worded in
that it left quite uncertain what easements and profits came
within its scope and failed properly to define the term "pre-
scription". Because of these defects the act was held not to
repeal but to supplement the common law mode of prescrip-
tive acquisition of easements.8 6 In other words, the presump-
tion of a lost grant was allowed to survive the statute as a
fundamental method of acquiring easement rights by prescrip-
tion.8 T
In the United States the developments must be regarded
as even more chaotic. A few American cases have rejected
83 Stoebuck, supra note 79 at 21.
84 1 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71 (1832), known as Lord Tenterden's Act.
85 Angus v. Dalton, 3 Q.B. Div. 35, 118; Dalton v. Angus, 6
App. Cas. 740, affg 4 Q.B. Div. 162.
86 7 HoLDSwoRTH, supra note 4 at 352; Angus v. Dalton, 6 A.C.
740.
87 Stoebuck, supra note 79 at 22. STEPHENS, Co nv=TAmS oN
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 342 (1950); The survival of the
old presumption led Holdsworth to remark: "What is re-
quired is a total repeal of existing common and statute
law, and the substitution of an entirely new set of rules,
based upon an understanding of the meaning of the doc-
trine of prescription, and of the results at which it should
aim." 7 HoInswoRTH, supra note 4 at 352.
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the fiction of a presumed grant. In these cases prescription
of easements is treated as governed by statutes fixing the time
for acquisition of title to land by "adverse possession". In
this manner the time span for prescriptive acquisition of cor-
poreal and incorporeal rights in land is brought into parity
in a fashion similar to that accomplished by the Roman law
in its final development.88 Some courts cling to the traditional
doctrine, applying to the presumption of lost grant the time
limitations fixed in the old English statutes.8 In most juris-
dictions, where the presumed grant theory is followed, the
presumption of grant is drawn from that period which coin-
cides with the local statutory provision for acquisition of title
to land by adverse possession.90 The effect given to the pre-
sumption is not uniform; in some states the presumption is
conclusive, in others rebuttable.91 Although every state has a
statute fixing a definite period for acquisition of title to land
by adverse possession, and the concept of acquisitive prescrip-
tion, as applied to corporeal interests, is now generally ac-
cepted in the United States,9 2 there is a marked absence of
statutory provisions regulating prescriptive acquisition of in-
corporeal rights in land. If a single modern tendency can be
divined it is to treat the characteristics of "adverse possession"
and "prescriptive user" as identical so as to require open,
peaceful and non-permissive attributes in both cases,98 and to
apply the same periods for corporeal and incorporeal inter-
ests. In some instances the English lost-grant doctrine is also
applied to corporeal interests. This is a purely American de-
velopment.
It is difficult to compare the present state of the English
law of prescriptive easements with that in America as there
8 Stoebuck, supra note 79 at 23.
89 Id. at 24.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 27.
9s Id. at 23.
94 Id. at 28.
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is no uniformity on this side of the Atlantic. The only mean-
ingful comment that can be ventured is that at least in Eng-
land an attempt was made to bring prescriptive acquisition
of easements under statutory periods of definite duration,
while in America the evolution has been left almost entirely
to the decisional law.
Conclusion
In both the Roman and the English law the earliest ap-
plication of prescriptive acquisition of incorporeal rights in
land is associated with personal custom, openly indulged in
for a long period, and with a presumption of lawful beginning
drawn from the continued, peaceful, manifest and non-per-
missive nature of the use. Neither system started with a defi-
nite period of prescription but both eventually passed to that
stage, though in a different way and by a dissimilar process.
The most interesting feature of resemblance is that neither
in the Roman nor in the English law did prescriptive acquisi-
tion of incorporeal interests become fully fused or merged
with prescriptive acquisition of corporeal rights. Although
the Roman law, as it finally evolved, did apply the same basic
periods of prescription to corporeal and incorporeal rights,
the acquisition of the latter did not require either bona fides
or iustus titulus. In the English system the acquisition of cor-
poreal and incorporeal rights is still governed by different
prescriptive periods. In the United States there is perhaps a
rather unique judicial tendency to achieve complete uniformi-
ty in rules applicable to acquisitive prescription of corporeal
and incorporeal interests, but this salutary trend could be
accomplished much faster and better with the aid of specific
legislation. Only statutes can purge the American law of the
lost-grant fiction and unveil the true essence of prescription
as a mode of acquiring property.
HABENT SUA FATA ... LEGES.
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